Curb sets [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991), 141-146] are product sets of pure strategies containing all individual best-responses against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining players. The concept of minimal curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player's set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional bestresponses of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. Minimal strong curb sets are shown to exist and are compared with other well known solution concepts.
Introduction
The notion of Nash equilibrium does not incorporate the possibility that groups of players might coordinate their actions to reach an outcome that is better for all of them. Aumann (1959) was …rst to introduce this consideration into the theory of noncooperative games by proposing the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. A strategy pro…le is a strong Nash equilibrium if it is immune not only to individual deviations, but also to coalitional deviations. Later on, Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston (1987) have proposed the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. A strategy pro…le is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium if it is immune to coalitional deviations which are themselves immune to further deviations by subcoalitions. The main weakness of strong Nash equilibrium and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is that existence is not guaranteed in a natural class of games, as opposed to the Nash equilibrium concept. Basu and Weibull (1991) have proposed a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium: minimal curb (closed under rational behavior) sets. 1 This set-valued solution concept combines a standard rationality condition, stating that the set of recommended strategies of each player must contain all best responses to whatever belief he may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players, with players'aim at simplicity, which encourages them to maintain a set of strategies as small as possible.
In this paper we introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoretic coarsenings of the notion of (strict) strong Nash equilibrium. We require the sets to be immune not only against individual deviations, but also against group deviations. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player's set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. A strong curb set is minimal if it does not properly contain another strong curb set. Think of the set of recommendations to a player in a minimal strong curb set as a well-packed bag for a sports 1 Many games of interest lack strict Nash equilibria. A strategy pro…le is a strict Nash equilibrium if each player's equilibrium strategy is better than all her other strategies, given the other players'strategies. In any non-strict Nash equilibrium, at least one player is indi¤erent between her equilibrium strategy and some other strategy, given the other players'strategies. Such indi¤erence can make the Nash equilibrium evolutionary unstable. See Weibull (1995) .
weekend: you may want to be prepared for di¤erent kinds of sports since you may like playing tennis with player 2 or playing golf with playing 3 or playing bridge with players 2, 3 and 4 or going alone for a jog. Minimal strong curb sets are shown to exist in general and are compared with other well known solution concepts: strong Nash equilibrium, coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, and coalitional rationalizability.
Finally, we provide a dynamic motivation for the concept of minimal strong curb sets. Hurkens (1995) has proposed a dynamic learning process where players have bounded memory and play best-responses against beliefs, formed on the basis of strategies used in the recent past. This learning process leads the players to playing strategies from a minimal curb set. 2 We propose a similar learning process except that now groups of players may play coalitional best-responses. A game is played at discrete point in time. For each role in the game there is a pool of players. At the beginning of each period one player is drawn from each pool to play the game in that period. These players are partitioned into coalitions to form a coalition structure.
Each coalition structure has a positive probability to occur at each period. Players observe how the game has been played in the recent past, form their beliefs upon these observations, and select an action pro…le jointly with their coalition partners.
We show that, if the memory is long enough, play settle down in a minimal strong curb set.
The paper is organized as follows. We recall notations and de…nitions in Section 2. We formally de…ne the concept of minimal strong curb sets in Section 3. We compare minimal strong curb sets with strong Nash equilibria, coalition-proof Nash equilibria and coalitionally rationalizable strategy pro…les in Section 4. We provide a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a minimal strong curb set in Section 5. We conclude in Section 6.
Preliminaries
Strict set inclusion is denoted by and weak set inclusion is denoted by . A normal-form game is a tuple G = N; fA i g i2N ; fu i g i2N , where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng is a …nite set of players, each player i 2 N has a nonempty, …nite set of pure strategies (or actions) A i and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u i : A ! R, where
The set of all games is denoted by . For every X A, let X i = j2N nfig X j , 8i 2 N . The subgame obtained from G by restricting the action set of each player i 2 N to a subset X i A i is denoted -with a minor abuse of notation from restricting the domain of the utility functions u i to j2N X j -by
The set of mixed strategies of player i 2 N with support in X i A i is denoted by (X i ). Payo¤s are extended to mixed strategies in the usual way. Beliefs are pro…les of mixed strategies: correlation is not allowed.
The pro…le of strategies where player i 2 N plays a i 2 A i and her opponents play according to the mixed strategy pro…le
is the set of pure best responses of player i against her belief i . Basu and Weibull (1991) have introduced the concept of strategy subset closed under rational behavior (curb), which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium. Formally, curb sets are de…ned as follows.
De…nition 1.
A curb set is a product set X = i2N X i where (a) for each i 2 N , X i A i is a nonempty set of pure strategies; (b) for each i 2 N and each belief i of player i with support in X i , the set X i contains all best responses of player i against his belief:
Curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player's set of recommended strategies must contain all best-replies to whatever belief he may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. Since the full strategy space is always curb, particular attention is devoted to minimal curb sets. A curb set X is minimal if no curb set is a proper subset of X. Basu and Weibull (1991) have shown that every game G possesses at least one minimal curb set. The set-valued solution concept that assigns to each game its collection of minimal curb sets is denoted by min-curb. Hence, min-curb(G) = fX A j X is a minimal curb set of Gg. Similarly, curb(G) = fX A j X is a curb set of Gg.
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The notion of strong Nash equilibrium is due to Aumann (1959) . A strong Nash equilibrium is a strategy pro…le such that no subset of players has a joint deviation that bene…ts all of them. Coalitions are nonempty subsets of players (J such that J N and J 6 = ?). For every X A, let X J = j2N nJ X j , 8J N .
The pro…le of strategies where players belonging to coalition J play according to the strategy pro…le a J 2 i2J A i and the remaining players play according to the mixed strategy pro…le
Formally, the notion of strong Nash equilibrium is de…ned as follows. The strategy pro…le a 2 i2N A i is a strong Nash equilibrium if and only if, 8J N , 8a J 2 j2J A j (a J 6 = a J ), 9 i 2 J such that
A strong Nash equilibrium is strict if the last inequality holds strictly.
Strong curb sets
While the concept of curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium, we now introduce the concept of strong curb sets which is a settheoretic coarsening of the notion of strict strong Nash equilibrium. That is, we require the set to be immune not only against individual deviations (as for curb sets), but also against coalitional deviations. Let us generalize the concept of best response to coalitions of players.
De…nition 2. For each vector of beliefs = ( i ) i2N with i 2 j2N nfig (A j ), the set of coalitional best-responses of coalition J N is
whatever belief she may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players.
A formal de…nition is provided in the appendix. Every curb set is a prep set and every curb set contains a minimal prep set. But, minimal prep sets may contain a proper subset of the strategies contained in the minimal curb sets. Kalai and Samet (1984) have introduced the notion of persistent retracts which require the recommendations to each player to contain at least one best-response to beliefs in a small neighborhood of the beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the other players. Voorneveld (2005) has shown that, in generic games, persistent retracts, minimal prep sets and minimal curb sets coincide.
Given a vector of beliefs , a pro…le of strategies a J for coalition J is a coalitional best-response if (i) each member i 2 J prefers to join coalition J and playing a J rather than playing her individually best-response against her belief i , (ii) there is no other pro…le a 0 J 6 = a J such that all members of J strictly prefer a 0 J to a J . Conditions (i) and (ii) captures some rudimentary form of coalitional rationality.
First, a sensible concept of coalitional rationality should prescribe coordination on strategy pro…les so that all coalition members have incentives to join the group.
Second, it should be conceivable that members of coalition J will never coordinate their play on strategy pro…les that are Pareto dominated. Of course,
Example 1. Consider the normal-form games
Take the normal-form game G 1 and let J = f1; 2g.
and (D; L) are never coalitional best-responses for J whatever . Condition (ii) makes that (D; R) is not a coalitional best-response for J whatever . However, the strategy pro…le (U; L) satis…es both conditions whatever . Thus, CBR f1;2g ( ) = f(U; L)g. Notice that the set of coalitional best-responses, CBR J ( ), may be empty if jJj 2. Take the normal-form game G 2 and consider the beliefs = ( 1 ; 2 )
and the expected payo¤s are u 1 (U; 1 ) = 2 and u 2 (R; 2 ) = 2. Thus, we have that CBR f1;2g ( ) = ?.
A set X is a strong curb set if the belief that only strategies in X are played implies that players and coalitions have no incentives to use other strategies than those belonging to X. Formally, strong curb sets are de…ned as follows.
De…nition 3.
A strong curb set is a product set X = i2N X i where (a) for each i 2 N , X i A i is a nonempty set of pure strategies;
(b) for each J N and each vector of beliefs = ( 1 ; :::; N ) of the players with each belief i having support in X i , the product set X J = j2J X j contains all coalitional best-responses of coalition J against the beliefs of its members:
Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player's set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. 4 A set X A is not a strong curb set if there exists a coalition having a deviation outside the set of recommended strategies such that each coalition member is at least as well o¤ by deviating for at least one possible belief concerning the play of others in the set of recommended strategies.
A deviation is blocked if we can …nd one player who is strictly better o¤ by blocking the deviation. Notice that each coalition member is allowed to have a di¤erent belief concerning the play of others in the set of recommended strategies to assess the pro…tability of the deviation. In other words, the coalition members may disagree on where the deviation leads to.
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A strong curb set X is minimal if no strong curb set is a proper subset of X. The set-valued solution concept that assigns to each game its collection of minimal strong curb sets is denoted by min-strong-curb. Hence, for a game G, min-strong-curb(G) = fX A j X is a minimal strong curb set of Gg and strongcurb(G) = fX A j X is a strong curb set of Gg. Every normal-form game has a minimal strong curb set. 4 We assume that players choose pure strategies. However, the notion of strong curb set can be easily extended to mixed strategies simply by accommodating the de…nition of CBR. Then, strong curb sets would still be product sets of pure strategies but such that each player's set of recommended strategies contains now the support all coalitional best-responses of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. 5 We are implicitly assuming that players do not update their beliefs by trying to understand why some coalitional action is a best-response for the other players of the coalition. 6 Similarly to strong curb sets, we can de…ne the notion of strong prep sets. Strong prep sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player's set of recommended strategies must contain at least one coalitional best-response of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. We provide a formal de…nition of strong prep sets in the appendix. Proposition 1. Every normal-form game G has a minimal strong curb set.
Establishing existence of minimal strong curb sets in …nite games is simple.
The entire pure-strategy space A is a strong curb set. Hence the collection of strong curb sets is nonempty, …nite (since A is …nite) and partially ordered by set inclusion.
Consequently, a minimal strong curb set exists. In the appendix we show that the existence result holds for every game G 2 G, where G is the class of normal-form games G = N; fA i g i2N ; fu i g i2N where for each player i 2 N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, A i is a compact subset of a metric space and u i : A ! R is a continuous von NeumannMorgenstern utility function.
If X is a minimal strong curb set of G = N; fA i g i2N ; fu i g i2N , then it is a minimal strong curb set of the subgame G X = N; fX i g i2N ; fu i g i2N . The intuition behind the proof of this result is the following. In the game G, for every possible belief pro…le with support in X, there is no pro…table deviation outside X (since X 2 min-strong-curb(G)). Then, there is no deviation from some subset Y X outside X for beliefs with support in Y . Since Y = 2 min-strong-curb(G) (as it would contradict that X 2 min-strong-curb(G)), there should exist a deviation from Y to
Proof. Let X 2 min-strong-curb(G). X is a trivial strong curb set of the subgame
Since Y is not a minimal strong curb set of G, there exists a vector of beliefs concentrated on Y and a coalition J N such that each member of the coalition prefers to play a strategy pro…le outside the set Y rather than playing a best-response in Y to his belief. Formally, since Y = 2 min-strongcurb(G), there exists J N , a J 2 j2J A j nY j and = ( 1 ; :::; N ) with i 2
, the aforementioned deviation of coalition J does not belong to j2J X j nY j , we have a J 2 j2J A j nX j . Since X 2 strong-curb(G) and
, at least one member j 2 J prefers to play a best-response in X against the belief j than playing according to a J . Thus, we have
we have u j (b j ; j ) > u j (a j ; j ) for some b j 2 X j , for all a j 2 Y j . This contradicts the fact that Y 2 strong-curb(G X ) since we have identi…ed a belief which is such that BR j ( j ) * Y .
Relationships with other solution concepts
In this section we relate the concept of minimal strong curb set to the concepts of strong Nash equilibrium, coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and coalitional rationalizability. The product set of actions chosen in every strict strong Nash equilibrium is a minimal strong curb set. Conversely, for every minimal strong curb set composed of one action per player, the strategy pro…le in which each player selects this action is a strict strong Nash equilibrium. The main weakness of the strong Nash equilibrium concept is that it fails to exist in a natural class of games. However, the existence of minimal strong curb sets is guaranteed in general. The question we now address is whether minimal strong curb sets allow us to make reasonable predictions in games in which a strong Nash equilibrium does not exist. We provide below a game in which a strong Nash equilibrium does not exist but the unique minimal strong curb set is a proper subset of the full strategy space. The collection of minimal strong curb sets may be composed of more elements than the product set of actions chosen in every strong Nash equilibria even when strong Nash equilibria exist. Consider again the game G 3 for a > 4. The strategy pro…le (D; R) is the unique strong Nash equilibrium of the game. The set composed of those actions is thus a minimal strong curb set. But, fU; M g fL; Cg is another minimal strong curb set. As a consequence, the unique strong Nash equilibrium may not be the only reasonable prediction in this game.
We now establish that if X A is a strong curb set and a 2 i2N X i is a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the subgame restricted to X, then a is a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the original game.
curb set of G and a 2 i2N X i is a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the subgame
, then a is a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the original game G.
A is a strong curb set of G, a 2 i2N X i is a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the
is not a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the original game G. Since a is not a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the original game G, there exists a coalition J N and a strategy pro…le a
Since X is a strong curb set of the original
. It contradicts the fact that a is a strict strong Nash equilibrium of the subgame
When a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium exists, its support is not necessarily contained in a minimal strong curb set, as the following example shows.
Example 3 (Ambrus, QJE 2006) . Consider the normal-form game G 4 . L C R U 2; 1; 0 0; 0; 0 9; 9; 9 M 2; 0; 1 1; 0; 2 9; 9; 9 D 9; 9; 9 9; 9; 9 9; 9; 9 l L C R U 1; 2; 0 0; 2; 1 9; 9; 9 M 0; 0; 0 0; 1; 2 9; 9; 9 D 9; 9; 9 9; 9; 9 9; 9; 9 c L C R U 9; 9; 9 9; 9; 9 9; 9; 9 M 9; 9; 9 9; 9; 9 9; 9; 9 D 9; 9; 9 9; 9; 9 8; 8; 8 r
The unique coalition-proof Nash equilibrium of G 4 is (D; R; r), while the unique minimal strong curb set is min-strong-curb(G 3 ) = ffU; M g fL; Cg fl; cgg. The predictions obtained under the minimal strong curb set seem more reasonable than the one given by the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium.
Outside the equilibrium framework Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) have proposed the concept of rationalizability which consists of an iterative procedure that eliminates at each round strategies that are never best-response. Strategies that survive this iterative procedure are said to be rationalizable. Basu and Weibull (1991) have shown that every strategy contained in a minimal curb set is rationalizable. 7 However, contrary to curb sets, strong curb sets may include strategies that are strictly dominated or even not rationalizable. We have that the action U (L) is strictly dominated for player 1 (2) but belongs to the unique minimal strong curb set of G 5 . Indeed, min-strong-curb(G 5 ) = ffU; Dg fL; Rgg.
Ambrus (2006) has proposed the concept of coalitional rationalizability using an iterative procedure. 9 The construction is similar to the original de…nition of rationalizability provided by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) , except that not only never best-response strategies of individual players are deleted by the procedure, but also strategies of group of players. Strategies of group of players are deleted if it is in their mutual interest to restrict their play to the remaining set of strategies.
The set of coalitionally rationalizable strategies is the set of strategies that survive the iterative procedure of restrictions. with their own best responses. 8 Hofbauer and Weibull (1996) have provided a class of evolutionary selection dynamics under which strictly dominated strategies do survive for some games. 9 Ambrus (2009) has provided an alternative concept of best-response to coalitions of players and he has o¤ered epistemic de…nitions of coalitional rationalizability in normal-form games. 10 However, the converse may also be true. Minimal strong curb sets may have more cutting power than coalitional rationalizability. In G 7 the strategy pro…le (M; C) is a strict strong Nash equilibrium and min-strongcurb(G 7 ) = ffM g fCgg. But, any strategy pro…le is coalitionally rationalizable.
Learning to play min-strong-curb strategies
We now provide a class of dynamic learning processes in which groups of players may coordinate their actions. In line with Hurkens (1995), 11 players observe actions played recently, form their beliefs upon these observations, and play best-responses to those beliefs. The new feature of the processes we propose is that players are allowed to play coalitional best-reponses. That is, players are allowed to select a joint action if by doing so, the expected payo¤ of each member of the group is increased with respect to the payo¤ she would have obtained by playing individually.
We will show that the learning processes we propose lead the players to play only strategies from a minimal strong curb set, and thus provide a dynamic motivation for the concept of minimal strong curb set.
A game G = N; fA i g i2N ; fu i g i2N is played once every period. In each period, one player is drawn at random from each of n disjoint classes C 1 ; C 2 ; :::; C n , to play the game G in that period. These players are partitioned into coalitions to form a coalition structure. A coalition structure J = (J 1 ; J 2 ; : : : ; J M ) is a partition of the player set N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng such that J k \ J l = ? for k 6 = l and [ 
) is the probability of moving from state h 2 H to state b h 2 H in one period and b h2H P (h; b h) = 1 for all h 2 H. A learning process is described by a transition matrix P 2 P, where P is de…ned as follows.
De…nition 4. Let P be the set of transition matrices P that satisfy for all histories h, b h 2 H, P (h; b h) > 0 if and only if (i) b h is a successor of h, (ii) there exists some J 2 J and = ( 1 ; :::; n ) with
At each period every player chooses an action. This action can be chosen individually or in group, and is chosen after having observed the recent past play. When a group of players coordinate their actions, they choose a Pareto undominated action pro…le such that each member of the group bene…ts from playing jointly. In state h, if coalition J N has a coalitional best-response a J 2 CBR J ( ) given a pro…le of beliefs with support in the set of strategies played in the recent past, then the process moves with positive probability from state h to state b h in which each member of coalition J plays according to a J . To determine the outcome of such learning processes, what matters is to identify, for each state h, the set of states that can be reached from h in one period with positive probability and those that cannot be reached. Since the exact probability does not matter, we do not have to specify a particular process of belief formation nor a protocol of coalition formation. We only require that every such belief with support in the set of actions played recently and every partition of the players occur with positive probability.
of the Markov process with transition matrix P 2 P : P 1 = P and
Now de…nes a weak order on H. We can de…ne an equivalence relation on H: Markov chain, no matter where the process starts, the probability that the process is in an ergodic state after k steps tends to 1 as k tends to in…nity (see Kemeny and Snell, 1976) . Proposition 4 states that if memory is long enough (K high enough), the probability that the players are playing a minimal strong curb strategy pro…le after k steps of the learning process tends to 1 as k tends to in…nity. To prove this result it is su¢ cient to show that each ergodic set Z of every Markov chain with transition matrix P 2 P satis…es Z X K for some X 2 min-strong-curb(G).
Proposition 4. There exists K 2 N such that for all …nite K K and every
Markov chain with transition matrix P 2 P; if Z H is an ergodic set then Z X K for some minimal strong curb set X.
. Let M = max(jA 1 j ; :::; jA n j ; n i=1 jA i j n). Take K = L + M and let K K be …nite. Let P 2 P. To prove Proposition 4 we will show that (i) from any history h 1 2 H, the process moves with positive probability
from state h L , the process moves with positive probability in M steps to a state
is a minimal strong curb set, and (iii) steps (i) and (ii) imply that if Z H is an ergodic set then Z X K for some minimal strong curb set X. The following lemma will be useful to prove Proposition 4. (b) Assume that i2N i (h t ; t) is a strong curb set. Take any partition J 2 J and any pro…le of beliefs with support in the set of actions played in the last t periods ( = ( 1 ; :::; n ) with i 2 j2N nfig ( j (h t ; t))), we have that every pro…le of 
and since every strategy in a minimal strong curb set is an element of a coalitional best-response to some belief concentrated on the set, there exists a set fb Once in h L+K , each player plays with probability one actions from the minimal strong curb set X in all future periods. The set X K thus contains an ergodic set.
(iii) By contradiction, suppose there exists an ergodic set Z such that Z * X K for any minimal strong curb set X. Thus Z contains an ergodic state h 2 H such that h = 2 X K for all minimal strong curb set X. Applying (i) and (ii), we have h. This contradicts the fact that h is an ergodic state and thus that Z is an ergodic set.
Remark 1. Take any game G = N; fA i g i2N ; fu i g i2N such that jA i j > 1 and jA j j > 1 for i; j 2 N , i 6 = j. We have M = n i=1 jA i j n. Suppose we are in state h L and
is a minimal strong curb set of G. Let k = max(jX 1 j ; :::; jX n j) and let l = We have k = 3 since player 2 selects her strategy L only when coalition f1; 2g plays (U; L). Player 3 selects her strategy r only when coalition f1; 3g plays (U; r). A third period is needed for player 1 to play D.
Conclusion
Basu and Weibull (1991) have introduced the notion of curb sets which are product sets of pure strategies containing all individual best-responses against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining players. The concept of minimal curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash equilibrium. In this paper we have introduced the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Strong curb sets require sets to be immune not only against individual deviations, but also against group deviations. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each player's set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of each coalition to whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other players. We have shown that minimal strong curb sets exist in general. We have also compared minimal strong curb sets with other well known solution concepts. Finally, we have provided a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a minimal strong curb set only. [ Y 2R (CBR J ( ) \ j2J (A j nY j )) and CBR J ( ) \ j2J (A j nY j ) = ; for all Y 2 R (Y is a strong curb set). This establishes that X is a strong curb set. The fact that it is minimal follows directly from the fact that R is a maximal nested subset of Q.
B Strong prep sets
Voorneveld (2004) has proposed another set-valued solution concept, prep sets, which are formally de…ned as follows. in X i , the product set X J = j2J X j contains at least one coalitional best response of coalition J against the beliefs of its members: 8J N; 8 = ( 1 ; :::; n ) with i 2 l2N nfig (X l ), i 2 N , CBR J ( ) \ j2J X j 6 = ?.
A strong prep set X is minimal if no strong prep set is a proper subset of X.
Every strong curb set is a strong prep set, so if a strong curb set is contained in a minimal strong prep set, the two sets are necessarily equal. Similarly to Proposition 2 we have that, if X is a minimal strong prep set of G, then it is a minimal strong prep set of the subgame G X .
